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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
number of directors to be elected, the less the representation accorded
to a minority. The minority was entirely deprived of representation
in the Syphers case, and this was held to be in violation of article
XI, section 4, before amendment. This decision is criticized in
19 U. PrrT. L. REv. 806 (1958). The holding in the principal
case was expressly stated not to be contrary to the Syphers holding.
Now that it is constitutional to limit the power of stockholders to
vote for directors it is forseeable that the validity of staggered di-
rectorates will be litigated again.
The majority opinion in the principal case does operate to
serve the best interests of corporations doing business in West Vir-
ginia. Furthermore the decision sets at rest a confusion which has
existed some sixty years, and clearly gives a corporation the right
to issue stock giving holders "full, limited, or no voting powers"
in the election of directors or managers.
John Everett Busch
Federal Tax Lien-Effect of State Statute of Limitations
The United States brought an action to recover so much of a
debt owed to a delinquent taxpayer that would offset the tax de-
ficiency. The debtor contended that the state statute of limitations
had run against a preponderance of the obligation, W. VA. CODE
ch. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1955); therefore, the United States
was partially barred from recovery. Held, the statute of limita-
tions was tolled prior to the commencement of this action, and
the United States is entitled to all money not paid by the debtor
before notice of levy. United States v. Polan Indus., Inc., 196 F.
Supp. 333 (S.D. W. Va. 1961).
This decision held that the federal government was immune to
a state statute of limitations when enforcing a tax lien perfected
under federal law. The brunt of the debtor's argument was based
on the derivative nature of the government's claim. It asserted that
the government stepped into the shoes of the taxpayer and could
attain no greater rights than the taxpayer itself could claim. Thus,
the government could only stop the statute by starting suit. The
court admitted that the United States took the claim with all its
attendant infirmities. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414
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(1939). Had the statute run against the debt before the assessment
was made, the government could not circumvent that defense. United
States v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182 (D. N.J. 1957). But if such
were not the case, the lien in effect operated to transfer the claim
to the government. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th
Cir. 1955). The statute was at that instant tolled, since the govern-
ment acting in its sovereign capacity is immune from the state statute.
United States v. Nashville, C & St. L. R.R., 118 U.S. 120 (1886).
The court in the instant case relied heavily on United States
v. Jacobs, supra. The taxpayer in default, a family corporation, had
made loans to a director and principal stockholder. The debtor
pleaded the state statute of limitations which was found irrelevant
for two reasons. First, applying New York corporation law, the
court held that the debtor was continually liable on the loans because
of his relationship with the corporation. Second, proceeding on the
debtor-creditor theory, the state statute of limitations was not perti-
nant because the government had done everything required to perfect
its lien. From that point the statute was tolled. Granted the deriva-
tive nature affected the government's right, but not its remedy.
Upon what ground does the federal government proceed against
a debtor in apparent repose? The government is an instrument of
the people and out of necessity is clothed with sovereign immunity.
This immunity doctrine is traceable to England and the crown pre-
rogative. The king was the representative of the people, and it was
the British conception that he could only act for their benefit.
Being busy with the affairs of state, no British subject could hold
the king accountable for the misdoings of his officers. Therefore,
no time ran against the king. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries
*247. This fictional basis crumbles before modem constitutional
government which demands a different rationale. This rationale
was provided by Iustice Story in United States v. Hoar, 26 Fed. Cas.
329 (No. 15373) (C.C.D. Mass., 1821). The true foundation
currently rests on public policy. Citizens ought not pay for the
negligence of their representatives especially in the collection of
revenue. This view was exemplified in dicta where a foreign gov-
ernment's claim had been transferred to the United States. A state
limitations statute would ordinarily apply to a claim of a sovereign
government notwithstanding the argument for inherent sovereign im-
munity. Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938).
A law review comment upon the preceding case adversely critized
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the modem rationale. The writer felt that the government's legal
staff was more than competent to settle existing claims promptly.
Note, 47 YALE L.J. 132 (1938). In rebuttal it is well to note that
some fifty statutes of limitations effective against the Internal Revenue
Service would produce an insuperable maze. This lack of uniformity
and the attendant consequences was early recognized by Justice
Story in United States v. Hoar, supra. A comprehensive collection
of cases on this topic may be found in Note, Immunity from Statutes of
Limitations and Other Doctrines Favoring the United States as Plain-
tiff, 55 COLUM L. REv. 1177 (1955).
Seemingly, the most effective argument that a debtor can pro-
pose when pleading a state time statute rises from the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1952). Where the Constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States are not in question, the law
of the state governs. Some cases have simply found that a federal
law was determinative. In Board of Comm'rs v. United States, 100
F.2d 929 (1939), modified, 308 U.S. 343 (1939), the United States
brought an action on behalf of an Indian ward to recover back
property taxes. The statute of limitations if effective would have
barred recovery. However, it was not applicable because the Judiciary
Act of 1789 does not control in the face of a federal treaty.
Accord, United States v. Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878). But
assuming that a federal law is not conclusive, it follows that a district
court must apply the statute of limitations of the state in which it
hears the case. This assertion, however, was rejected in United
States v. Middler, 127 F. Supp. 686 (E.D. Mich. 1955). Unless
Congress intended the government to be bound it will not be. Legis-
latures deal with the rights and privileges of the people, and
generally any restraints placed thereon are for reasons not common
to government. Further, even a federal statute of limitations was
held inapplicable to the federal government where there was no
clear indication from Congress that it intended otherwise. United
States v. De Queen & E. R.R., 271 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1959).
The emphasis then is on the express assent of federal law.
Accordingly, Congress has provided a statute of limitations
for collection. The Commissioner is required to bring his action
six years from the date of assessment. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 6502. Thus, the assertion that a state statute of limitations is
a controlling factor after the assessment is substantially controverted.
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Finally, the state courts have recognized the federal position.
Taylor v. United States, 224 Mass. 639, 88 N.E.2d 121 (1949),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 948 (1949). A state probate court had
ruled a United States tax claim barred by a short state time statute.
Reversing, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the United States as a creditor of the alleged insolvent estate was
not barred by the statute in a state court. The principal case would
strengthen this holding and the federal government's position before
state courts.
In summary, for reasons of public policy and the maintenance
of a uniformity of laws, state time limitations do not apply to the
federal government when reducing a perfected tax lien to judgment.
James Kilgore Edmundson, Jr.
Instructions-Binding Instruction on Contributory Negligence
Need Not State Specific Acts of Negligence
P, a pedestrian, was struck and injured by an automobile op-
erated by D. At the trial, the court, at the request of D, instructed
the jury that it must find for D if it should believe that "... both
plaintiff and defendant were guilty of negligence which combined
and contributed to cause the accident. . . ." On cross-appeal, P
averred that this instruction was erroneous. Held, instruction proper.
It is not necessary for a binding instruction on contributory negli-
gence to state specific acts of negligence by the plaintiff, disapproving
Walker v. Robertson, 141 W. Va. 563, 91 S.E.2d 468 (1956).
Graham v. Wriston, 120 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 1961).
The problem of phrasing instructions on contributory negli-
gence has been the subject of much litigation in the West Virginia
courts. In expressly disapproving the holding in Walker v. Robert-
son, supra, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has de-
cisively settled any doubt concerning the requirements of such an
instruction in this state. The Walker case disrupted a previously
unbroken line of decisions in this state concerning contributory
negligence, and the holding in the principal case has now removed
that blemish from the law.
In the Walker case, the court instructed the jury that if it
believed from the evidence that ". . . the plaintiff was guilty of
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